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The last time I spoke to 'General' Ato Belly was on Thursday, 31 March 2011. It 
was the first night of the battle for Abidjan between armed forces defending 
the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and those dedicated to instating the 
elected president Alassane Ouattara.' This battle heralded the tragic finale of 
the post-electoral crisis which took a decisive turn with the arrest of Laurent 
Gbagbo, ten days later. The pro-Ouattara offensive was launched both from 
the rebel-held northern territories by the recently raised Republican Forces 
of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), and from within Abidjan by the so-called 'Invisible 
Commando' led by Major Coulibaly, alias lB. This urban guerrilla group had 
been active in Abidjan for more than a month when at the end of March, 
simultaneously with the final FRCI offensive on Abidjan, it began attacking 
strategie sites in the heart of the city: army camps and headquarters, the 
presidential palace and residence, and not !east the buildings of the national 
radio and television, RTI.2 In response, the pro-Gbagbo, so-called 'patriotic' 
armed forces stepped up their mobilization efforts by recruiting youngsters 
and/or handing out arms (mainly Kalashnikovs) to them. 
At about midnight on that Thursday, the 31st, Ato Belly was defending the 
RTl against the Invisible Commando when the deafening noise of detonations 
forced us to break off our (last) telephone conversation. Previously Ato had 
expressed his dismay about the speed of the FRCI blitz and (related to that) 
the alacrity with which the majority of the regular armed forces - called the 
FDS (Defence and Security Forces) - had abandoned their positions. Forestall-
ing an imminent military debacle for the pro-Gbagbo camp, Ato Belly took 
up the arms which he had officially put down back in May 2009. Then he 
was formally disarmed as a member, with the rank of 'general', of Abidjan's 
largest militia, the Grouping of Patriots for Peace (GPP, Groupement des 
Patriotes pour la Paix). Even when earlier that month patriotic youth leader 
Charles Blé Goudé urged youngsters to sign up for immediate recruitment 
into the army, Ato had declined the offer. Nonetheless, he told me how he 
found pride in assisting in the enrolment of many members of his gbôhi. 
The latter is the Nouchi term for gang or group and, as we will see soon, 
it can refer to different types of networks, bands and fractions, as weil as 
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formai militia groups (see also Banégas 2011). The junior militia members 
of Ato's gbôhi, he reported, were quartered at the prestigious infantry camp 
of Akouédo, and he reckoned they were finally very close to becoming real 
soldiers: 'they have a bed, a uniform, and a firearm of their own'. 
Ato Belly's reluctance to jo in the patriotic battle this ti me around was largely 
due to his resentment of the Gbagbo administration for Jack of recognition 
and remuneration for his participation in the previous patriotic battles (fol-
lowing the coup d'état of 2002). Among other things, his long-standing pro-
Gbagbo militantism had resulted in the creation in 2004 and 2007 of GPP 
militia barracks in different parts of Abidjan. Instead of official appreciation, 
Ato had seen both barracks being forcibly shut down by the FDS on direct 
orders from the president, whose embattled nation he was trying to defend. 
On top of that, the soo,ooo CFA (approximately 900 euro) demobilization fee 
promised to every formally demobilized militia member was never disbursed 
by the Gbagbo administration. This was all too much for Ato, who not only 
needed this money for his young family - living in a ramshackle house with 
a ten-month-old disabled daughter - but also for the hundreds of youngsters 
of his gbôhi who kept on hassling him for financial support or urging him 
to raise the matter of this broken promise among the militia leadership and 
its patrons in presidential circles. But against all odds, Thursday, 31 March 
offered the occasion for ultimate redress. 
During our last telephone conversation, Ato explained that he was rigged 
out in fu ll battledress, put together from the uniforms, boots, berets and belts 
left behind by the many FDS who had abandoned the RTl premises. He had 
even succeeded, he added, in procuring a number of shoulder marks (galons) 
which he would put on later. Also, he had an impressive number of weapons 
at his disposai: Kalashnikovs in great numbers as well as anti-tank RPG-7 
grenade launchers. Finally, Ato did not miss the opportunity to point out that 
all this took place in the presence, and with the support, of Gbagbo's finest 
and manifestly bravest army unit, the Republican Guards (Gardes Républic-
aines). They made this sudden transformation 'real': vouching for his value as 
a soldier, turning his hasty dressing-up into an official act of instantaneous 
conscription, and converting his seized weaponry and insignia into bestowals 
complementing his last-ditch, 'well-deserved' career move. 
Militias and pre-peace networking 
The above section recounts one of the many tragic micro-moments in Côte 
d'Ivoire's recent post-electoral drama which formed the violent denouement 
of a long decade of political-military strife. The latter started with the 1999 
coup d'état removing Henri Konan Bédié from power, followed by a turbulent 
military transition under General Guéï. Laurent Gbagbo's seizure of power 
in late 2000 and the (half-successful) coup d'état which ensued from this in 
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September zooz resulted in the creation of a rebel-held northern zone. The 
recent post-electoral crisis began when Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara 
both claimed victory in the November zo1o presidential elections. After four 
months of fruitless mediation the crisis took a decisive turn when the two 
protagonists had recourse to military force and Ouattara won owing Iargely 
to the support of the international community. 
The types of armed forces engaged in the conflict from 1999 were many and 
diverse. Apart from the regular military and security forces (FDS, and Iater 
the FRCI), and the international peacekeeping forces - the UN peacekeeping 
force ONUCI and its French counterpart Licorne - there were mercenaries, 
(gangs of) thugs, youth militias, hunter-warriors group (the so-called dozos), 
ad hoc armed youth groups and activist civilians providing shelter and food 
for the various combatants. 
Although estimates vary widely and (will) remain extremely difficult to make, 
one may posit that up to 40,000 people, mainly youngsters, were active in 
so-called parallel forces on both sides of the conflict. An estimated zs,ooo 
of them belonged to the pro-Gbagbo patriotic militias. The latter emerged 
in late zooz/early zoo3 within widely differing contexts of local and national 
mobilization. Although the large majority of the militia members waited for 
their official demobilization and disarmament until the end of zoo9, many 
were active in military operations only prior to zoos and only for a couple of 
months in total. 
With a few notable exceptions, the operations in which the patriotic self-
defence groups participated were of limited mi!itary significance. Ironically 
perhaps, but quite typical for the Ivorian situation, militia organizations were 
mostly established in the aftermath of the early decisive combats in the west 
(Chelpi-den Hamer zou), and anticipated post-war registration and so-called 
communal reinsertion programmes which began to materialize in a haphazard 
way from zoo9 onwards. Ali this time many remained mobilized or kept in 
contact with their units and commanders while attending to other activities. 
As we will see in more detail below, throughout the short decade of political-
military conflict (zooz- 11), the patriotic militias were the locus of extensive 
networking and, to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological 
choices, vast enterprises of civil society building. On the latter dimension of 
militia formation I have written elsewhere (Arnaut zoo8b, zoo8c). In this chapter, 
I focus more on its social dimension: the intricate processes of networking and 
the emergence of subaltern Big Men in the form of militia leaders. After ali, 
the post-war, or rather pre-peace, multiplication of militias and their growing 
impact on social and political !ife constituted a protracted, multifaceted and 
multi-sited process, which this chapter tries to begin to disentangle in terms 
of social mobility of a juvenile and subaltern kind. 
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Military triangulations 
The dynamics of expansion, dissemination and mobility of militias in south-
ern Côte d'Ivoire during the preceding decade had at !east three dimensions: 
(a) the flexibility of militia members as regards their resourcefulness and 
entrepreneurship, (b) the changeability of militia structures within strategies 
of clientelism and Iow-key elite formation, and (c) the proximity to the regular 
defence and security forces. The latter are commonly referred to as le(s] corps 
habillé(s}, meaning 'corps in uniform' (literally, 'the dressed-up corps'), and 
comprise severa! categories of uniform-wearing, arms-carrying civil servants: 
police, state police (gendarmes), specialized police units (such as environmental 
police), army and customs (douanes). By 'proximity' to the corps habillés, I mean 
either the latter's physical co-presence during training, on the front !ines, and 
in various sites and schemes of 'violent labour', or their omnipresence in the 
aspirations of the youngsters - as holders of secure employment and as icons 
of social success. As we will see at the end of this chapter, this proximity 
situates the corps habillés and the militias in a common 'field'. Theorizing 
this will allow us to get a firmer grip on youth, their social mobility and 
networking as dimensions of subaltern agency in times of crisis and violent 
conflict. But first, we need to grasp the basic entangled dynamic of militia 
members, their chiefs and patrons. 
Coming back to the issue of militia mobility, 'General' Ato Belly was defi-
nitely a stationary type, both geographically and in terms of militia member-
ship, but that did not make his calculations about his own and his fellow 
militiamen's social mobility any less judicious. Ato was an Abidjanese local 
taxi (woroworo) driver until in late zooz he j oined the patriotic movement. In 
early zoo3 he joined the Abidjan-based GPP militia and remained active in its 
networks until his death. Within the GPP Ato played a central role in succes-
sive attempts to establish camps (cantonnements) in Abidjan. He took the lead 
in transforming the girls' school Institut Marie-Thérèse into a GPP barracks. 
Between August zoo4 and March zoos this camp, branded the First Battalion 
of Commando Legionnaires (1er BCL), housed up to four hundred youngsters. 
Much Iater, in mid-zoo7, Ato made another successful attempt to accommodate 
severa! hundred militiamen who were out on the streets of Abidjan after having 
been chased from their camps and from the police and gendarme barracks 
in which they had been housed for severa! months. This time around, Ato 
chose the deserted run-down Hotel Akwaba along the Abidjan beach as his 
self-styled 'naval' base - located in Vridi, the neighbourhood where Ato was 
raised and spent most of his !ife. According to Ato, his sustained attempts 
to muster and accommodate his ex-combatants were meant to keep up their 
public visibility in anticipation of announced demobilization and reinsertion 
schemes. However, as we will see presently, given the inveterate uncertainty 
of these programmes, militiamen also bet on other horses. 
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Both from the Akwaba 'naval' base (until it was dismantled in November 
2008) and, even more so, from the above-mentioned First BCL camp in Adjamé, 
Ato observed and supported the to-and-fro movements of 'his' troops. On 
an individual basis or in groups of variable size (also called gbôhz), combat-
ants were seizing ail sorts of opportunities to valorize their 'violent labour' 
(Hoffman 2011) or other skills. In between answering one cal! or another for 
support on the front !ines, they carried out often very short-term contract 
work in as diverse areas as construction work and development projects, but 
mostly in security and vigilantism in very different sectors such as transport 
(or transport regulation) and poli tics. 
While serving as a dispatching centre for thousands of militia members in 
different war sites in the interior, the GPP in Abidjan increasingly fragmented. 
While in action along the so-called front !ines, GPP members formed new 
groups and networks which on return to Abidjan did not (fully) reintegrate into 
the parent organization. These new networks, referred to as gbôhi, sometimes 
took the form of new militia fractions with new leaders who proclaimed them-
selves 'general ' or 'commander'. Such was the case of the CNLB of Watchard 
Kédjébo, the FLP of Oliverson le Zoulou, and the GCLCI of Jimmy Willy, to 
name only three.3 The clearing of their only centralizing camp at the Institut 
Marie-Thérèse and the relative failure of subsequent camps such as the ones at 
Azito (Yopougon) and Biabou II (Abobo), as well as the aforementioned camp 
at Vridi (Port-Bouët), reinforced this process of disintegration which, in turn, 
was countered by subsequent attempts to regroup the militia factions. These 
federalizing attempts were either undertaken by long-standing GPP leaders 
such as President Bouazo Yoko Yoko Bernard or 'Chief of the Defence Staff' 
Jeff Fada, or by newcomers with relevant resources in the form of political 
contacts and financial means. Such was the case of 'General ' Jimmy Willy, 
who capitalized on his contacts with Gbagbo's FPI (Ivorian Popular Front) 
party in order to create the very influential federation Union of Self-defence 
Groups from the South (UMAS).4 
From the above description one can already infer that the fragmentation of 
militias was not only the outcome of grassroots militia mobility and network-
ing but also of intervention 'from above' - in casu, of sustained attempts by 
political and military entrepreneurs to ra ise militias or federations thereof and 
become officially recognized as their chiefs. The general dynamics of the Ivorian 
patriotic activism in general and militancy in particular are those of mobility, 
of fission and fusion. Tbese processes started within days of the outbreak of 
the conflict in September 2002 and, as far as we can discern, are still going 
on in the post-conflict period with militia leaders repositioning themselves 
and building new constituencies in the peace process. If Eugène Djué is now 
(May 2011) a figurehead of the reconciliation of patriotic militias with the new 
Ouattara regime, it is mainly due to his more or Jess consolidated status as 
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a Big Man of patriotic militantism: in order to mark his senior position as a 
militia paramount chief among the many militia 'generais', he labelled himself 
'marshal' (Arnaut 2006). 
Further to this point, it is significant that the GPP, the self-declared 'mother 
of ail patriotic militias', is itself the offshoot of an earlier patriotic organiza-
tion, the UPLTCI (Union des Patriotes pour la Libération Totale de la Côte 
d'Ivoire), created by Eugène Djué in the immediate aftermath of the September 
2002 insurgency. Almost at the same time, Djué's fellow former student leader 
and competitor in patriotic activism Charles Blé Goudé created the eventuaily 
hegemonie patriotic federation the Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Sursaut 
NationaL When, after a couple of months, Charles Groguhet and Touré Moussa 
Zéguen left Djué's activist UPLTCI and founded their own, more belligerent and 
instantly very popular, GPP militia, both Goudé and Djué recruited sorne of the 
GPP's trained combatants, while at the same time trying to incorporate the GPP 
and other organizations into their respective patriotic federations. The same 
double operation of patronage underlies the overall dynamics of the patriotic 
militias: (a) emerging patrons trying to draw together networks of adventurous 
and peripatetic juvenile militants (from below) while (b) capturing through 
federation (from ab ove) the networks that escape their control. 
In order to illustrate how the above processes were also at work in other 
militias, but above ali in order to introduce the aspect of the proximity of corps 
habillés as the third factor of militia dynamics, I introduce another character, 
a militia member called 'Marcus Garvey'. His case, in combination with that of 
Ato Belly, provides the core empirical ground for further theorizing subaltern 
mobility and networking in conflict situations. 
'Marcus Garvey', networker and 'Nouchi' 
Like Ato Belly, 'Marcus Garvey' took up arms again in the tragic finale of 
post-electoral conflict, after having been demobilized or waiting to be demo-
bilized for almost seven years. Also Iike Ato Belly, Marcus Garvey saw himself 
very muchas part of the so-called reserve pool or support base (base arrière) of 
the FDS, not by dispatching 'violent labour' or by accommodating its 'labour-
ers' in barracks (as Ato Belly did) but by executing such violent labour first as 
a combatant and later as the foreman (chef de dispositif) of a group engaged 
in security operations. In sum, both Ato and Garvey were Big Men of sorts, 
managing a network (gbôhz) of (ex-)combatants around them. Of both their 
networks nothing much is presently left: Ato's gbôhi has !ost its leader (and 
in ail probability most of its members), while Garvey's is entirely dispersed, 
reduced to a dozen friends trying to keep in touch by mobile phone. 
In March 2003, at the age of twenty-eight, Garvey left Abidjan, where he was 
born and raised, in order to join the western front near Guiglo. After a stay of 
about eight months, during which he was enrolled by the FLGO (Front for the 
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Liberation of the Great West) militia, Garvey was flown home in the company 
of exactly 677 Abidjan-based FLGO recruits. Following a short stay-cum-forced-
removal at the Akouédo army camp, half of the returnees, including Garvey, 
took up residence in the vicinity of the camp, in the unfinished bouses of a 
gigantic building site on the outskirts of Abidjan called Lauriers. Later on, 
for about seven months (November 2004-May 2005) Garvey ran a large-scale 
vigilante operation around the radio and 1V transmitting station of Abobo 
(northern Abidjan) in collaboration with the FDS. For this, he employed, ac-
cording to himself, more than two hundred (ex-)combatants, most of whom 
belonged to his already unravelling gbôhi at Lauriers. One year on, Garvey 
returned to Guiglo, where he associated himself with the MILOC! (Ivorian 
Movement for the Liberation of the West of Côte d'Ivoire) militia, which , in 
the meantime, had won a certain notoriety and was first in line to receive 
demobilization fees. In late 2008, after more than two years in Guiglo waiting 
fruitlessly to be demobilized, Garvey returned to Abidjan and joined what was 
left of his gbôhi at Lauriers. As before (2003-04), he and h is dispirited gang 
survived on small jobs, mostly in building, security or petty tracte, until the 
violent denouement of the post-electoral crisis made him and the remaining 
sixty members of his group take up arms again. 
On 3 March 2011 Garvey got hold of an AK-47 rifle from one of the many 
deserting trainees at the Gendarmerie School and j oined the armed forces who 
were defending the residence of the incumbent President Gbagbo at Cocody. 
When, one week later, heavy UN and French bombardments destroyed the 
entire defence infrastructure around the presidential residence, and the arrest 
of Gbagbo was imminent, Garvey abandoned the battle. He also walked out on 
what was le ft of his gbôhi, most of whom had decided to continue the struggle 
from the marine base at Yopougon, seconding the notoriously intrepid marine 
forces loyal to Gbagbo. Two months after this naval base was 'pacified' by 
national and international forces, in April 2011; only two members of Garvey's 
gbôhi have returned home. As before, Garvey now (May 2011) shares a squat 
in a storage container with his old mate Aubin (who was too ill to partake in 
the recent fighting). Garvey's girlfriend, who takes care of their three-year-old 
daughter, has been refusing to join her partner in this makeshift abode. 
Having no proper job, no proper house and no family in whose midst he 
resides, Garvey labels himself a 'noussi'. Going against the standard spelling 
of 'Nouchi', which refers to a broad category of (juvenile) urban vagrants and 
their slang (de Latour 2001; Newell 2ooga), Garvey employs an idiosyncratic 
etymology to stress the word's composition from the French morphemes 'nous' 
(we) and 'si' (if), while explaining that: 'We the unemployed, we the students 
who have diplomas but no jobs, we, children whom the street has given birth 
to without checking into the maternity hospital, it is us; if you could accept 
us in your society without too many arrière-pensées about us.' 
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This passage, in which Garvey tries to grasp the predicament of his exclu-
sion from mainstream society, is an excerpt from one of his many writings, 
which total about 350 pages of manuscript telling of h is !ife du ring the 2002-11 
violent conflict. His story, as weil as that of Ato (which is enshrined in about 
eight hours of recorded interviews), forms the core of the empirical basis for 
exploring what I have called the proximity of the corps habillés as a first step 
towards addressing the central questions of subaltern mobility and networking 
in times of conflict.5 
Corps habillés 
The relationship between the youth militias and the corps habillés during 
the 2002-11 conflict in Côte d'Ivoire entails (a) the latter's physical co-presence 
during training, on the front !ines, and in various other sites and schemes of 
'violent labour', and (b) the ir importance in the imagination of youngsters as 
icons of successful people with a (potentially) honourable profession, secure 
employment and a flourishing social !ife. Th is does not mean that youth 
militia members have an unqualified admiration for the corps habillés. Rather, 
the relationship between militia members and their professional counterparts 
is riddled with ambiguity. 
Reading through the writings of Marcus Garvey, it is difficult to miss the 
fact that, as for so many of his fellow combatan ts, proximity to the army 
is the alpha and omega of his engagement with militias. In the first pages 
of his war journal, Garvey reports a short conversation with a friend which 
instantly made him volunteer for the patriotic battle. When informing Garvey 
that an organization was being set up in order to dispatch youngsters to the 
front !ines, the friend explained its modus operandi as follows: 'You go, they 
train you, they drop you off on the battle front in order to fight alongside the 
FANCI (Ivorian regular army] and after the war, they put you in the army, at 
!east those who survived' (Garvey 2011: 7). 
The plausibility of this causal link between militia membership and entry 
into the regular army largely followed from the appeals of popular politicians 
in the early months after the insurgency of 2002, calling on youngsters to join 
the regular army, which was diagnosed as ageing, depleted, disheartened and 
in urgent need of reinforcement. Officially in late 2002 about three thousand 
of those who volunteered were incorporated into the army while thousands 
of rejected youngsters kept roaming the streets and public places of Abidjan 
for severa! months, hoping fruitlessly to become part of future recruitment 
campaigns. That is where the process of militia formation took off. 
Once they were incorporated in one or other self-defence group based either 
in Abidjan or on the front !ines in central and western Côte d'Ivoire, these 
volunteers immediately came into direct contact with members or former 
members ( either retired or dismissed) of the corps habillés. Among the earliest 
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recruits of the GPP were a group of sixty-five marines who had recently been 
dismissed for insubordination (Njabehi 18/6/zoo8; Shao 4/4/2009).6 Rather than 
becoming plain militia combatants, most (ex-)members of the FDS took more 
responsible positions and acted as trainers and coaches, exceptionally as militia 
leaders and in a few cases also as gatekeepers. In ali, members of the corps 
habillés occupied vital positions in the intricate patronage structure surround-
ing the militias. 
With few notable exceptions, such as that of 'Commander' Nahui Lazare 
' leader of the self-defence group MI-24, who was an ex-member of the Ivorian 
army (Nahui 26/3/2009), (former) soldiers and policemen acted most often as 
coaches and trainers of the militia groups. To start with the former category, 
the late Koré Moïse, alias 'Ministre de la Défense', was a military offi.cer ef-
fectively attached to the Ministry of Defence, who acted as a coach to the 
GPP leadership during the first years of the conflict (2002-05) (Ato 25/3/20o9; 
Saintgbal 21/3/2008; Delta and Assoumou 3/4/2009). A typical example of a 
trainer is 'Colonel' Zagbayou, who was a sergeant of the Ivorian army. In 
Abidjan he was one of the GPP's most important trainers from the very early 
days (Lago 8/4/2009; Njabehi 18/6/2oo8). Zagbayou continued his training of 
militia volunteers in Yopougon into the post-electoral crisis, and even ended 
up fighting alongside his trainees until the final days of patriotic resistance 
to Ouattara's election (Le Patriote, 11 January 2011; Times Live, 30 April 2011). 
On the western front sergeants like Koulaï Roger and Oulaï Delafosse played 
a similar role. Unlike Zagbayou, who appeared to have had good connections 
with the presidency, Koulaï and Delafosse were detached by their respective 
superiors, Colonel Oulé Yedess and General Denis Bombet, to train and coach 
the FLGO recruits. Importantly, higher officers such as Yedess and Bombet 
were less patrons than gatekeepers. As Big Men of the armed forces they 
warranted the temporary permeability of the military sector for enterprising 
and zealous youngsters. In this role the military gatekeepers were endorsed by 
political Big Men-cum-agitators such as presidential security councillor Kadet 
Bertin and patriotic youth leader Charles Blé Goudé, who regularly proclaimed 
the state's receptivity to juvenile input for its corps habillés. In fact, Bertin's 
and Blé Goudé's rapid rise to national prominence in itself indexed the new 
possibilities for youngsters. On top of the politicians who made public ap-
peals, there were those whose occasional public encouragement of youthful 
patriotic activism was complemented by moral, material and financial support 
for certain militias. Among these sponsors featured members of parliament of 
Gbagbo's FPI party, such as Nko Marcel and William Attéby, and fellow party 
member Geneviève Bro Grébé, president of the patriotic women's organisation 
(Ato 26/2/2010; Bouazo 19/3/2oo8). Together, the military gatekeepers as much 
as the politicians and propagandists who either represented or supported the 
militant youngsters inscribed the militias into the larger story of the emergent 
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'rejuvenation of the nation' un der President Gbagbo by showing them con crete 
pathways leading from militias into the military and by extension the corps 
habillés (see Arnaut zoos). 
More concretely, it is no exaggeration to say that ali ex-combatants of the 
self-defence groups I have spoken to could name at !east one member of the 
corps habillés who was involved in their training or in important military opera-
tions in which they partook (such as Dignité or Léopard). Moreover, many of 
the militia members spent sorne time in military precincts on the front !ines 
or in Abidjan. In and around Abidjan the prestigious marine base of Adiaké 
and the spacious 1St Battalion camp at Akouédo were important sites in that 
respect, and so were the two so-called war schools of Abidjan: the Ecole de 
Police and the Ecole de Gendarmerie (e.g. Guéï, KRR and Ato 10/4/2009). In 
ali of these places militia members received extremely variable treatment -
a puzzling alternation between being glorified and being humiliated, being 
nurtured and accommodated one moment and starved and chased at gunpoint 
the next. As we will see presently, a similar ambivalence was at play in the 
core signifier of the corps habillés: the uniform, which could connote dignity 
and righteousness as much as cowardice and travesty. 
One of the central items of proximity between the corps habillés and pa-
triotic militias was the outfit they wore. References and anecdotes relating 
to the uniform or battledress (treillis), including the shoulder marks (galons) , 
beret (beret), boots (rangers or rénaux) and belt (ceinturon) , crop up in almost 
any conversation with ex-combatants. This is also the case in Garvey's auto-
biography. Merely four months after his arrivai on the western front line, he 
reports that militia members from Guiglo went out demonstrating half naked 
in military drill (pas-gym) while chanting 'Give us uniforms.'ï This incident 
heralded ever-growing tensions between the militia rank and file on the one 
hand and its leadership and the corps habillés units at Guiglo on the other. 
Eventually, as mentioned, this resulted in the deportation of more than six 
hundred FLGO youngsters to Abidjan in early October 2003. Also, as I explain 
below, this event exemplarily revealed the broader meaning of 'dressing up ' in 
the context of the Ivorian conflict and the participation of militant youngsters 
in it. 
To 'dress up the militia members' (habiller les éléments) does not simply 
mean providing them with uniforms or authorizing them to wear them, but 
falls nothing short of giving them official employment, including registration, 
monthly salary, healthcare and pension schemes, etc. That is what Sergeant 
Koulaï Roger, the FLGO's main trainer and Yedess's aide-de-camp, referred to 
when in response to the nude pas-gym he promised that h is trainees would 
ali 'be dressed', while severa! months later, just days before their deportation 
to Abidjan, he broke down in tears, admitting: 'I have lied to you, you will 
not be dressed here' (Garvey 2011: 21). This strongly indicates that the militia's 
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focus on uniforms is much more than a (juvenile) obsession with outward 
appearance. As we will see presently, apart from considering the uniform as 
indexing a potentially critical move regarding social mobility, for its aficionados 
it also functioned as a marker of moral distinction. 
As could be expected, the military leadership gave preference to its regular 
troops when it came to the distribution of battledresses and equipment. Garvey 
reports on the frustration this sometimes caused among his fellow FLGO 
members, but while explaining this he also provides us with sorne elues as to 
how this combines with a more general disdain for the FDS's (in)significance 
in the maintenance of public order in a front-line city like Guiglo. During the 
rainy season of 2003, he writes: 'The policeman at his roadblock could sleep 
throughout, the gendarme commuted between the Mini Shop bar and his desk, 
while the soldier was busy managing his women's business when he wasn't 
attending to the roadblock.' In order to measure the degree of Garvey's low 
estee rn for ali three categories of the corps habillés, it is important to know that 
not only was drinking at the Mini Shop and flirting considered to be of little 
benefit to national security, but also hanging around the office was despised 
as a futile wartime activity, and occupying a roadblock even more so. This is 
also explained by Ato Belly (25/3/zoog), who, in a long narrative about the day 
he decided to abandon his job as a taxi driver in order to 'liberate his country', 
insulted the policemen who approached him at the central junction (le grand 
carrefour) of Abidjan's important commune of Koumassi: 'I told them: this 
country is dying and you are here busy racketeering along the road; one asks 
us to go and libera te Bouaké, you have the required arms but you use them to 
force taxis to stop.' The fact that, as a taxi driver, Ato had been undergoing the 
racketeering-at-gunpoint of these police officers for many years certain! y added 
to his frustrat ion and to the ferocity of his scolding. However, it is probably 
not so much the practice of roadside racketeering itself at which Ato took 
offence - after ail, that was also one of the militias' favourite activities - but 
the fact that the corps habillés' arrogance towards helpless citizens masked a 
proven lack of courage when it came to facing an armed adversary. This was 
also exemplified in the way the FDS dealt with their uniforms. 
The most obvious sign of the cowardice among the FDS was what 'General' 
Ato Belly witnessed in 2002-03 as much as in 2011: imminent attacks by rebel 
forces were preceded by massive desertions. As Ato experienced on 31 March 
2011 at the national radio and television site, these desertions began with a 
basty change of clothes. In 2003 Richard and Eric (10/4/zoog), two members of 
Ato Belly's gbôhi, identified this as the reason for their own recruitment into a 
special commando to attack a rebel stronghold near Daloa: the FDS who were 
stationed there 'had taken fright, they undressed ... they took their rifles and 
threw them away, they put on civilian clothes and fied'. Consequently thirty-
five GPP members such as themselves and fifteen professional commando 
88 
troops from Akouédo formed a new commando which received the same red 
(marines') berets, the same uniform and the same weapons- for Richard and 
Eric a source of profound job satisfaction . 
Finally, uniforms were a way of distinguishing oneself not only from the 
non-uniformed civil servants or from civilians, but also from different armed 
units, and most of aU from enemy troops. Recounting his admission to the GPP, 
Ato explains that he feared confusion and infiltration when he observed that 
GPP militia members were dressed in the same way as the rebels he had seen 
on TV: wearing no proper boots (rangers) but plastic sandals (lèke) , and merely 
uniform trousers plus T-shirt (bas treillis) (Ato Belly 7/6/2008).8 As the late GPP 
'general' Shango (14/6/2oo8) explains, dressing up like the rebels was sometimes 
part of the tactics used mainly on the western front (see Utas and jèirgel2oo8 for 
parallels). In other circumstances, wearing the full uniform was indispensable 
and an important part of the military etiquette. During the military crisis of 
November 2004, Ato Belly (26/2/2010) explains, his troops started seconding the 
elite Republican Guards to assist in their task of defending the presidential 
residence. The way Ato recounts it, the trustworthiness and the dedication of 
both groups as expressed in their sharing full dress (treillis complet) warranted 
the fraternal co-presence of both formai and informai armed forces. This brings 
us to the 'social' dimension of the relationship between both groups. 
Militia members generally refer to the corps habillés as their 'eider brothers' 
(grands frères). This relationship carries the full ambiguity of their rapport: it 
combines familiarity with respect and, at times, resentment, which in practice 
underlies their mutual complicity as much as inequality and the militia's 
subjugation. The deep sense of complicity is weil illustrated by, for instance, a 
whole series of mu tua! engagements with the FDS, which Garvey reports in his 
writings. One typical example relates to the arrangements for the roadblocks 
or checkpoints (corridors) and patrols (patrouilles) which Garvey and his gbôhi 
set up in the vicinity of the transmitting station of Abobo du ring the time they 
were responsible for its protection. At four so-called passageways (corridors) 
members of Garvey's group undertook the rather lucrative activity of checking 
the identity papers and luggage of passers-by while taking bribes from them. 
By doing this they entered into direct competition with the surrounding corps 
habillés, who were happy to be eut in on the deal. 'The eider brothers agreed,' 
Garvey (2011: go) notes with satisfaction. 
At certain dramatic moments this complicity between militias and the 
military was reversed by the latter, who used their power and position to 
discipline or punish their 'younger brothers'. In late 2006 and early 2007 more 
than three hundred GPP youngsters experienced this during their time at the 
aforementioned Abidjanese war schools. While initially the militias were weil 
received there, the relationship rapidly deteriorated in the run-up to the March 
2007 Ouagadougou peace accord, and resulted in the militia members being 
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chased at gunpoint from their guest abode. However humiliating such forced 
evacuations and other reprimands were, they were sometimes glossed over as 
the legitimate right of 'eider brothers' to correct or admonish their younger 
siblings (Delta and Assouma 3/4/zoog). Finally, such reprimands were ail the 
more humiliating when they involved uniforms. When in November zooS Ato 
Beiiy's so-caiied naval base at Vridi was evacuated by the chief of staff, General 
Philippe Mangou, himself, the sad climax was that ali uniforms, boots and 
milita ry gear were put on one big stack and set alight in the presence of 
television cameras (Ato Beiiy zs/3/zoog). In spite of deeply traumatic events 
such as these and other camp evacuations, many militia members maintained 
the desire to join the military one day. Such tenacity requires our theoretical 
attention, presently. 
Subaltern mobility: going in circles? 
The above detailed description of the complex and ambivalent relationship 
between the military and the militias through the prism of corps habillés aiiows 
us to safely speculate that for militia members FDS uniforms and military gear 
were important markers of a prospective transition process which could lead 
into the heart of the corps habillés. Such a process starts, quite plainly, with a 
change of clothes, as described in graphie terms by the Jate GPP 'commander' 
Roger Njabehi (z6/3/2oog): 'because we were civilians, we had to put on a military 
uniform ... in order to help the military ... and the military were aware of that, 
and the gendarmes were a iso aware of that: th at the se kids the re are helping us; 
so we are going to fight along with you, "dress them", and they have dressed us'. 
However, as we know now, with the exception of a few lucky ones, thousands 
saw their military dreams unfulfiiied for sorne time (Banégas zooS). 
The magnitude of this disillusion is certainly proportional to the recursivity 
of the false promises expressed by many important political and military en-
trepreneurs, and at critical moments echoed by the militia leaders themselves 
in a desperate attempt to keep their gbôhi mobilized and rallied behind them. 
However, the impact of these messages 'from above' must be qualified by 
considering the tactics 'from below' - the sustained attempts by youngsters 
to infiltrate the corps habillés in spite of the successive disiiiusionments and 
even downright rejections over a period of many years. For many of the militia 
members, as for Ato Belly and Marcus Garvey, these disiiiusionments repeated 
themselves over a period of eight long years and ended sorne time in March 
zou, in a decisive if,not fatal bid to enter the corps habillés. By then the lat-
ter were perceived as stripped of the weak, the cowards and the impostors 
who, in an ultimate démasqué, had abandoned their battledresses. The m ilitia 
members' adherence to the uniforms in itself became a demonstration of their 
unabated Ioyalty and the proof that they deserved what they had been asking 
for since day one: 'being dressed'. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I want to further explore the effects and, 
above ali, the mechanisms of these tactics of impersonation within broader 
frames of apprenticeship, on-the-job training and social mobility. As a start-
ing point, it is important to be aware that the youngsters were somehow 
conscious of the fact that by putting on sorne military garb and hanging 
about in the vicinity of the corps habillés they were playing a big game, with 
ali the ambiguity that came with it. Near the end of zoo7, after yet another 
six months of waiting for the demobilization and reintegration programme 
in Guiglo to resume, Garvey noted: 
I am 32 years old, it is true that without having served in the army, I have 
served in the army. I have frequented it so much that I can daim I was with 
it, this army, it is beautiful, impressive but hypocrite and treacherous. When 
I recall the words of sergeant Koulaï Roger I feel myself suffering, regretting. 
I still see him sobbing, teiiing us that he merely executed orders. That makes 
me feel like throwing up: to offer hopes of beauty and of strength, and shatter 
these in such a hypocritical way. In one word, I have walked alongside this 
beauty, this imposing and betraying hypocrite and I have come to detest it in 
the end. (Garvey zou) 
The central metaphor of this paragraph - companionship - provides sorne 
guidance for starting to devise an analytical framework for subaltern (social) 
mobility in times of crisis. Garvey looks back on a trajectory in which he 
became entangled with the army, learned much about it, but never really 
became part of it, never fully inhabited the corps he so eagerly wanted to 
belong to. Instead, in phrases such as 'I was with it' (my emphasis), Garvey 
positions himself as a (travelling) companion of the army. This matches the 
general theme of his autobiography, which he entitles 'The Companion', and 
in which he addresses the reader throughout as 'my companion'. Companion-
ship has at !east two strings of meanings which relate to social mobility and 
networking respectively. In the realm of social mobility, the companionship 
implies an enduring situation of in itiation or apprenticeship without ever 
reaching full proficiency. Garvey sees himself Iingering in a situation of trun-
cated mastery which for sorne time constitutes a source of hope but eventuaiiy 
also of desperation. Equaiiy so in the realm of networking - the enduring 
co-travelling produces 'company' in many forms, albeit mainly of a rather 
ephemeral and cursory nature. The corn panions of the army and corps habillés 
in their capacity as eider brothers have a large stake in regulating the seesaw 
movement of nearing (complicity) and distancing (subjugation) between the 
militia dilettantes and the properly 'dressed' FDS professionals. Furthermore, 
militia members seek the company of friends or 'compagnons de route' and 
more often than not consider themselves as belonging to a gbôhi. Although at 
certain times the gbôhi can be a strong locus of identification and solidarity, 
91 
w 
it has very permeable boundaries and is in constant flux as people join and 
leave. Finally, militia activity creates conduits to the bigger world of national 
politics, magistrature and top-leve! administration. The web of military and 
political patronage surrounding the self-defence groups in Côte d'Ivoire in the 
preceding decade resulted both in occasional contacts and short- or long-term 
contracts between members of both realms. Having addressed Gbagbo directly 
in the course of a protest action was a source of pride for Marcus Garvey, as 
much as it was a source of prestige for Ato Belly to have met the army chief of 
staff, Philippe Mangou, on severa! occasions. More durable and lucrative were 
the special operations or long-term bodyguard con tracts for poli ti cians, judges 
or top-leve! civil servants which certain militia members were able to secure 
for themselves and their gbôhi. A good example of this was the two-month 
contract Ato Belly concluded with the Mauritanian ambassador in February 
2011 whereby he and a dozen of his 'elements' protected the embassy and the 
hundreds of Mauritanian refugees it accommodated at that time. 
In ali, the networking as much as the on-the-job training of militia ap-
prenticeship was rather shallow and elusive, and, for the large majority of the 
militia members, never resulted in full mastery, a stable professional or patron-
age network, or a far-reaching identification with the coveted corps habillés. 
Instead, the relationship with the latter largely boiled down to a fascination 
for what Garvey calls its 'beauty and strength' - that is, its outward appear-
ance epitomized by the uniforms and paraphernalia, and its strength indexed 
by the firearms and the direct impact of carrying weapons in public. Thus, 
in spite of their tenacity and dedication, militia members remained forever 
'outside' and hierarchically 'below' the army 'corps' - enduringly peripheral 
and subaltern. Any further theorizing should start from here. 
lncr-ementalism, imper-sonation and the field 
Tens of thousands of youngsters who try to supplement the state's corps 
habillés can be taken as an instance of what AbdouMaliq Simone describes as 
'incrementalism' (Simone zoo8a: 17). In his usage, this refers to the graduai 
albeit sometimes rapid process of haphazard extension in the construction of 
houses, markets and other urban infrastructures (ibid.: 16). When applied to 
institutional contexts such as the corps habillés, incrementalism alerts us to 
the proliferation of 'state'; what Aretxaga (2003: 369) identifies as 'an excess 
of statehood practices: too many actors competing to perform as state'. This 
enables us to further develop the idea launched in the introduction to this 
volume, that the absence of the state in Africa leaves voids that are filled by 
entrepreneurs of different sorts. 'Incrementalism' does not start from possible 
voids but from the supplementing or multiplying of operations in the vicinity of 
state institutions, which may either condense and extend them or drain them 
and trim them down. As one of Hibou's seminal texts on state transformation 
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- in accord with founding texts such as that of Bayart (Bayart et al. 1999) and 
Reno (1995) -points out, the privatization of the state does not sim ply concern 
its 'décharge' (discharge) but also its 'dédoublement' (duplication/multiplication) 
by way of the 'intensive use of intermediaries' (Hibou 1999: 13-1.4). More recent 
studies in domains as diverse as administration (Blundo 2006) and conflict 
transformation (Engel and Mehler zoos; Mehler 2009; Menkhaus 2008) show 
the empirical potential of exploring this multiplication or refraction, resulting 
in the creation of vast terrains of hybrid state-related activity. The mediation 
that takes place there falls within the formai/informai networks evoked in the 
introduction to this volume. The networks described in the preceding sections 
of this chapter consist of gbôhi and militia structures with shifting degrees of 
formality as weil as the patron networks that surround them. Central nodes in 
these hybrid mediating structures are Big Men of different scales and weight 
who occupy equally ambivalent positions in transition zones between state 
and non-state activity. 
In order to understand such zones of state mediation it is important not 
only to acknowledge the pull factors of state 'décharge': formai (guided by, say, 
the World Bank or the Washington Consensus) as weil as informai privatization. 
The obvious 'push factors' of state mediation are youth unemployment or, more 
generally, Jack of opportunities. This situation has been rightly identified as 
'social death' (Vigh 2006) or 'blockage' - as a Jack of mobility and opportuni-
ties 'to keep the options open' (Simone zoo8b). The (auto)biographies of Ato 
Belly and Marcus Garvey offer us a certain insight into the tactics of setting 
out on a voyage that could open the possibility of entering the composite 
state institution of the corps habillés. The tactical movements of the militant 
youngsters take place in the vague terrain situated between a state-in-crisis 
which is outsourcing its military force and a vast group of youngsters engaged 
in what Mitchell (2007) would perhaps cali a 'counter-inscription of the state'. 
In sum, it seems proper to suggest that the main j uvenile tactics, those of 
impersonation and dressing up, are above ali an 'art of being in between' 
(De Certeau 1984: 30). Like 'la perruque' - De Certeau's locus classicus of the 
subaltern tactics of the detour: the diversion of labour time in government 
and commercial administrations as much as in factories - the militia activity 
of so many militant Ivorian youngsters during the past decade can best be 
understood as a sustained 'act of camouflage, of counterfeit and make believe' 
(ibid.: 37) aimed at helping them insinuate themselves into the state and its 
institutions. 
These provisional remarks on impersonation are meant to indicate that we 
are dealing with a particularly complex phenomenon which requires the kind of 
empirical and theoretical grounding which this chapter is mere! y able to begin 
to provide. After ali, we need to account for the reflexive dialectics involved in 
dressing up (from below) and being dressed up (from above), or, more broadly, 
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in the appropriation and registering of forms, types and postures which cir-
culate within the urban, national and transnational Ivorian space - to the 
extent that, in themselves, these forms come to stand for circulation, (social) 
mobility and advancement in life. Any proper interpretation of impersonation 
as a subaltern tactic must avoid slipping into simplistic, supremacist, if not 
downright (neo)colonialist conceptions of subaltern mimicry (Apter 1999; and 
see Fabian 2002; Ferguson 2002). 
The broader empirical grounding for juvenile impersonation in patriotic 
militantism and activism in Côte d'Ivoire must be sought within popular culture 
and popular politics (see also McGovern zou), which in the preceding decades 
had been vested in new urban culture, sometimes labelled 'Nouchi'. To describe 
the success of Nouchi in Ivorian public life over the last two decades is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. It suffices to situate the expansion of Nouchi street 
culture in the period of fast urbanization of the 198os, and, most importantly, 
its take-up by the student 'revolutionary' movements of the 1990s. This, in tu rn, 
led to the introduction of street culture and discourse into opposition politics, 
mainly in the hands of the leftist FPI party and its leader Laurent Gbagbo; and, 
when the latter came to power in zooo, to its sedimentation in mainstream 
politics (Arnaut zoos, zoo8a). By and large, what many Ivorians seem to observe 
in poli tics is comparable to what Newell (2009b) describes as 'bluff' in economie 
and sexual exchange in Abidjanese urban street culture, and what before him 
Banégas and Warnier (2001: 8) identified as 'mischievousness, astuteness, [and] 
the right of the strongest ... in a moral economy of shrewdness and "débrouille"'. 
What makes the bluff particularly interesting is 'the incorporation of deceitful 
illusion and illocutionary performance into economie transactions, gender roles, 
and daims to modernity' (Newell 2009b: 384). Very important for our purposes 
is the fact that in typical bluff settings none of the participants is completely 
fooled: 'It was at once based on the idea of deception and prestige of illusion, 
yet at the same time no one was fooled, the audience was aware of the hoax 
before the show even began. And yet, everyone acted as though the bluff were 
real' (ibid.: 385). In conclusion, Newell (ibid.: 385) daims: 'the audience's aware-
ness of fakery was irrelevant, it was the aptitude for artifice that earns respect 
and praise, and had transformative potential'. 
The politician who embodied this 'aptitude for artifice ' most cogently was 
President Gbagbo, the Biggest Man in the country at the time, in his capacity 
as 'the baker' (le boulanger), who, according to the French expression to which 
this epithet refers, 'rolls everyone in flour' (il roule tout le monde dans lafarine) 
- that is, takes everyone (his colleagues, and his opponents as much as his 
electorate) for a ride. However, if streetwise bluffing is a youth competency, 
so are its political and activist variants. One of the most flagrant instances 
of juvenile political 'bluff' was the so-called 'Versailles Accord' signed in July 
zoo6 by 'warring' youth leaders such as Charles Blé Goudé and Karamoko 
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Yayoro six months before the senior politicians signed a new peace agree-
ment at Ouagadougou. Adding to the 'artifice' was the fact that 'Versailles' 
in the aforementioned accord did not refer to the French town where the 
post-First World War peace agreement was signed, but to Café de Versailles, 
a bar-restaurant in a posh part of Abidjan owned by Ivorian reggae superstar 
Alpha Blondy. The juvenile 'Versailles Accord' had ali the makings of a success-
ful 'fakery': a peace accord named after a world historical event, discussed in 
a trendy Abidjanese pub by youth leaders who not only impersonated senior 
national and international negotiators and simulated the drafting and signing 
of the peace agreement, but who also anticipated the latter and, th us, imposed 
themselves as political players to be reckoned with. 
The well-frequented popular parliaments were another example of youthful 
political bluff involving more than a handful of junior political leaders. The 
flippant use of 'Versailles' resembled in this respect the use of 'La Sorbonne' 
as the name of Abidjan's most notorious people's parliament. 'La Sorbonne' 
was created in Abidjan's administrative centre (Le Plateau) in the 198os and 
served as a mode! for hundreds of other popular parliaments set up si nee zooo 
(Bahi 2003, 2004: 59; Yao Gnabeli zoos). Like the renowned Parisian university, 
to which they relate through the Abidjanese 'La Sorbonne', the many parlia-
ments employed self-styled 'professors' who delivered 'scientific' analyses, thus 
claiming sorne sort of 'open university' status for their political propaganda 
(Atchoua zoo8; Bahi 2001: 159). A final example of juvenile activist 'bluffing' is 
that which took place on a grand scale in the urban militias and the southern 
youth militant groups in general. As we have seen, the simulations of 'real' 
military !ife were manifold and pertained to matters of rank, outfit and attire, 
and, of course, activities. Among these the use of military titles by the GPP 
leadership was the most flagrant, since not only did GPP members recognize 
them but also civilians and the FDS acknowledged them publicly, whether in 
tongue-in-cheek fashion or more or Jess seriously - depending on the power 
balance at the moment of interaction (Arnaut zoo6) . 
Lastly, in a recent paper Newell (zoo9a) invites us to situate impersonation 
and 'bluff' at the very heart of Nouchi culture. Bluffing, he argues, as the 
appropriation of alterity, is also central to the urban slang called Nouchi. 
Taking most of its lexical material from French, Nouchi also incorporates 
lexical material from English and a number of national languages such as 
Dyula, Baule and Bété. By dethroning 'metropolitan' French and venturing 
into trans-local and transnational linguistic terrains, Nouchi indexes urban 
cosmopolitism and modernity (ibid.). But there is more to it. Nouchi is in 
constant flux and its speakers take pride in using the latest new words or even 
try to introduce them themselves by transferring lexical material from other 
'languages' within their repertoires. This is illustrated by Marcus Garvey's 
autobiography, in which he enriches 'standard' Nouchi with expressions which 
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he himself identifies as 'military slang' or 'builder's idiom'. Taken together, 
his repertoires index his 'walks of life': the different sectors of society and of 
professional activities which he straddles. In other words, his Jinguistic agility 
is a function of his (professional) flexibility, and his potential social mobility. 
Taking our Jead from Mbembe (1992; Mbembe and Roitman 1997), who saw 
the multiplication of identities as a performative tactic in what he calls the 
post-colony, the impersonating behaviour of Ivorian youngsters can be seen as 
an attempt to insinuate themselves into different spheres of activity in order 
'to keep the options open' (Simone 2008a; Simone 2oo8b ). The ultimate task, 
which this chapter can merely initiate, is to conceptualize this. 
The theoretical frame of the topography and performativity of the kind 
of juvenile impersonation observed above consists of three related analytical 
concepts: articulation, navigation and fields. 
Taking her Jead from Gramsci and Hall, Tania Li (2007: 22) looks at identi-
fication as well as the social practice of 'political subjects' in terms of articu-
lation - that is, 'the multiple positions that people occupy, and the diverse 
powers they encounter '. For research purposes, articulation 'points rather to 
the necessity of teasing out, historically and ethnographically, the various ways 
in which room for manoeuvre is present but never unconstrained' (Li 2000: 
153). Navigation, as used by Vigh (2008) and Utas (2005; Utas and Jôrgel 2008), 
partly based on Honwana (2ooo: 77-8) and De Certeau (De Certeau 1984), is 
precisely conceived in order to account for this 'room for manoeuvre'. Situa-
tions of crisis, according to Vigh (2008: 18), 'force agents to take into account 
not only how they are able to move within a social environment, but also how 
the social environment moves them, and other agents within it, as they seek 
to traverse envisioned trajectories'. Navigation implies a dialogical relationship 
between actors and their social environments; hence more attention needs 
to be given to the actual constitution of the terrain on which it takes place. 
Between overstressing stability and predictability and merely characterizing 
actors' mobility as 'motion within motion' (ibid.), an intermediate position 
seems possible, acknowledging that flow and fixity constitute each other as 
much as mobility rests upon structures of immobility (Hedetoft and Hjort 
2002; Lien and Melhuus 2007: ix). In order to make this into more than a 
truism , we need sorne concept of 'field' without - and here I agree with Vigh 
- adopting the rather heavy and static concept Bourdieu made of it. Instead, 
our analyses of tactical agency may profit from a rather open, dynamic notion 
of field which helps . ..to identify and map 'terrains' in terms of the stakes and 
opportunities they contain, the competencies they value and the expectation 
they nourish. Taken as such, a field largely corresponds with Turner's defini-
tion of it as 'an ensemble of relationships between actors antagonistically 
oriented toward the same prizes or values (in this case control over the state 
apparatus)' (Turner 1974: 135). The dynamic and open nature of such a field 
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allows us, above ali, to register how these fields alter through the incursions 
of 'navigating' actors - as weil as other external interventions (Martin 2003). 
As far as the identification of fields is concerned, contemporary field theory 
allows us to define fields rather loosely and according to specifie analytical 
needs, more or Jess as 'spheres of activity' or 'registers of social action' in 
the Weberian sense (Lahire 1999), even related to particular social networks 
(Breiger 2004). In this chapter I have focused mainly on the 'corps habillés' as 
a field and ventured into interrelated fields such as popular culture, media 
and popular politics. 
Afterthoughts in lieu of a conclusion 
The first months of the new Ouattara administration have witnessed a series 
of far-going interventions into public space. Within days of taking power, Alas-
sane Ouattara ordered the FRCI to clear out and destroy La Sorbonne, signalling 
the imminent demise of the dozens of popular parliaments in Abidjan and 
other urban centres in Côte d'Ivoire. More recently (August 2011), Yopougon 
saw the demolition of large sections of the Rue Princesse, Abidjan's archetypal 
nightlife hot spot and breeding ground of world-famous music genres such 
as Mapouka, Coupé-Décalé and Ivorian rap. The destruction of these sites 
of popular culture and popular politics makes us realize the extent to which 
over the Jast decade public !ife, at !east the pro-Gbagbo part of it, had been 
flourishing in a novel and vigorous human infrastructure and built environ-
ment. Two items of this public culture - generally Jabelled 'Nouchi' - which 
rose to prominence and proliferated in many different guises in this milieu 
were gbôhi and 'bluff'. 
In this chapter, 'bluff' was presented as a key performative tactic in a 
broader politics of impersonation of subaltern urbanites concerned with their 
ever-threatened social mobility. In the hands of the thousands of members 
of patriotic youth militias, 'bluffing' had the corps habillés as its target and 
took the form of a tenacious and sometimes fatal impersonation of military 
postures, discourse and practices. The cases of Ato Belly and Marcus Garvey 
demonstrate how unrewarding this politics of impersonation was and how it 
merely resulted in a state of enduring apprenticeship without full mastery, or 
ongoing 'companionship' without a proper 'joining in'. The latter observations 
bring us to the gbôhi, the second important item of urban public life which 
flourished during the Gbagbo era. Gbôhi thrived in Nouchi in the 2ooos as a new 
term for 'gang' derived from the Dyula term for 'house', 'gbo'. Simultaneously, 
it was adopted in militia circles as the key term for referring to the intricate 
process of networking: the fission and fusion of groups and 'groupuscules', 
the continuous fragmenting and merging of formai self-defence groups as 
weil as the formation and disintegration of smaller fractions, of bands of 
friends and of ad hoc squads of youth militia members offering their 'violent 
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labour' to state and non-state actors. The cases of Marcus Garvey and Ato Belly 
not only illustrated the vibrancy of networking but also revealed the double 
dynamics of bigmanity involved in this: the search of groups for leadership 
and patronage as weil as the quest of Big Men to gather and coach 'elements', 
merge fractions and federate militia groups. 
By choosing to approach the problematic of this volume on networks and 
Big Men in conflict situations within a perspective of impersonation and social 
mobility, I have tried to bring out both the geographical and the historical 
specificity of militia formation in the Ivorian conflict of the preceding decade 
and its universality in terms of juvenile subalternity and post-colonial urbanity. 
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Notes 
1 It was the last telephone conversa-
tion because Ato Belly died soon after. It 
appears that Ato was seve rely wounded 
during that night's battle and spent a 
couple of days in hospital before being 
acquitted. Less than one week into his 
convalescence, Ato was shot dead in 
his house by people who have so far 
remained unidentified. 
2 The his tory of IB and his Invisible 
Commando remains to be elucidated. 
His role in the battle against Gbagbo is 
as murky as his participation in the coup 
d'état of 2002. On 27 April IB was killed 
and his Invisible Commando dismantled. 
3 CNLB = Comité National pour la 
Libération de Bouaké; FLP = Front pour 
la Libération du Peuple; GCLCI = Groupe-
ment des Combattants pour la Libération 
de la Côte d'Ivoire. 
4 UMAS = L'Union des Mouvements 
d'Autodéfense du Sud. '-
5 The en tire corpus of formai and 
informai in terviews on which this chapter 
is based amounts to approximately 110 con-
ducted with seventy-four interlocutors dur-
ing four spells of fieldwork between March 
2008 and March 2010. In order to document 
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the post-electoral crisis ofNovember 
2010-May 2011, I kept in touch with about 
seventeen former interlocutors, most! y by 
telephone and sometimes by email. 
6 The standard format for referring to 
formai field interviews is 'Name d/m/y'. 
7 The full song is 'Donnez treillis oooh 
ça va finir (2x)' (Give us uniforms oh it 
will finish), adding 'han got the natty 
dread'. The word 'dread' is an interesting 
contamination of dress (the expression 
'natty dress') and dreadlock, which 
together with the rest of the English, 'got 
the', indexes the presence of Liberian 
fellow combatants (mercenaries as weil 
as members of the LIMA militia) on the 
western front. Garvey could not explain 
the meaning of the word 'han'. 
8 Having observed this confusion, Ato 
Belly proposed to the militia leadership 
that they create and supervise a GPP intel-
ligence service. 
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41 Demobilized or remobilized? Lingering rebel 
structures in post-war Liberia 
Mariam Pers son 
Introduction' 
Over the years there have been numerous examples of how forma! security 
institutions in contemporary Africa have proved incapable of providing, or 
unwilling to provide, its citizens with basic security. Not surprisingly, mis-
trust of these forma! institutions and authorities has made people turn to 
alternative solutions to cope with their everyday lives and safeguard their 
basic human security. What is surprising, however, is how little we still know 
about these informa! security mechanisms in Africa. International donors and 
others who seek to contribute to the strengthening of the security context 
in African states have repeatedly failed to look beyond the official façade of 
the state and its forma! security institutions in order to gain a deeper and 
more comprehensive understanding of security and insecurity in Africa. But 
without acknowledging the informa! we will undoubtedly be unsuccessful in 
recognizing the very actors, mechanisms and networks ordinary African citizens 
often rely on for their basic security. Accordingly, we may fail to acknowledge 
and support security structures and initiatives that actually do work while 
providing assistance to inefficient or unavailable security mechanisms. By 
searching beyond and beneath the official state structures and forma! insti-
tutions for security provision, we will be able to recognize the importance 
of informa! security providers and come closer to an understanding of how 
informa! security networks operate. While doing this we will also be able to 
identify influential, yet informai, actors of power that may not be visible from 
a forma! state-centred perspective, and more importantly, perhaps this will 
enable us to identify hidden links between the formai and informai power 
structures shaping the security reality of many African countries. 
In August 2003 the warring parties of Liberia signed the peace agreement 
that after two civil wars (1989- 96 and 1999-2003) ended years of brutal fighting 
in the West African country. The war-torn republic now faced enormous chal-
lenges. Liberia was to be rebuilt, and security inaugurated. Since then Liberia, 
with major assistance and funding from the international community, has 
undergone a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation 
(DDRR) process of ex-combatants to restore peace and stability, and security 
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helps us think more critically and creatively about who benefits from 
African crises - and why outsi de interventions so often fail.' 
DANNY HOFFMAN, AUTHOR OF THE WAR MACHINES: YOUNG MEN 
AND V/OL £ l S ERRA LEO. EA 'D B£ 11 
'Thi s i mportant collecti on of great articles on " Bigmani ty" will 
certainly become a central reference for different discipli nes. Thi s 
book offers a multitude of entry points to thi s important topic.' 
ANDREAS MEHLER, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS 
AT THE GERMAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL AND AREA STUDIES 
'This fascinati ng and important set of studies ... provides 
essenti al i nsights for anyone who seeks to establish fai rer and 
more peaceful structures for resource management.' 
CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, CENTRE OF AFRICAN STUDIES, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 
&W~ .!fr. . .\1 
In the aftermath of an armed conflict in Africa, the international 
community both produces and demands from local partners a vari ety of 
blueprints for reconstructing state and society. The aim is to re-formalize 
the state after what is viewed as a period of fragmentation. In reality, 
African economies and polities are very much informal in character, 
with informal actors, including so-called Big Men, often using t hei r 
positions in the formal structure as a means to reach their own goals. 
@ 
Through a variety of in-depth case studies, including the DRC, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, African Conflicts and Informal 
Power shows how important informal political and economic 
networks are in many of the continent's conflict areas. Moreover, 
it demonstrates that without a proper understanding of the 
impact of these networks, attempts to formalize African states, 
particularly those emerging from wars, will be in vain. 
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